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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the federal government aggressively moved to con-
tract out work previously performed by its own employees. Although
an elaborate set of substantive rules governs whether to contract out,2
when violations of these rules allegedly occur,3 a set of outdated proce-
dural doctrines have often insulated 4 potential violations from challenge
* Charles Tiefer is Professor, University of Baltimore Law School; B.A., summa cum
laude, Columbia College, 1974; J.D., magna cum laude, Harvard Law School, 1977. Jennifer
Ferragut is a recent graduate from the University of Baltimore Law School. The authors
would like to thank the skilled staff of Emily R. Greenberg for their library/computer
assistance.
I Federal civil service employment shrank from 2.17 million in 1990 to 1.80 million in
1999, with contracting out a significant reason. A Decade of Shrinking (table), in Cathy New-
man, Expecting a Government Expansion, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2000, at A29. "By FY 2002,
DOD plans to have studied 150,000 more positions and predicts that competing these positions
will save $6,000,000,000 by FY 2002." Stephen Sorett & David R. White, The Problem of the
Level Playing Field and Idle Facilities And Labor in A-76 Competitions, 34 PROCUREMENT
LAW, 10, 10 (Spring 1999).
2 See discussion infra Part II.
3 A particularly interesting academic treatment is by Professor Render, who concludes
about one combination base closing and contracting-out "that high ranking Navy officials are
perfectly willing to deal behind the backs of lower level employees and to violate the law to
reach a desired result." Edwin R. Render, The Privatization of a Military Installation: A Mis-
application of the Base Closure and Realignment Act, 44 NAVAL L. REV. 245, 280 (1997).
4 See, e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 883 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
For a comment on an important, but unpublished case which did allow a union challenge, see
Jayna Richardson, Comment, Outsourcing & OMB Circular A-76: Sixth Circuit Opens the
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by the natural protesters, the federal employee labor unions. 5 In 2000-
2001, a pair of judicial and General Accounting Office (GAO) rulings
blocked the latest litigation efforts by an employee union to protest im-
proper contracting-out. 6 This issue takes on special importance, as the
Bush Administration accelerates the contracting-out practices of the re-
cent past following the comparative lull of the election year.7
The intrinsic merit of contracting-out has become increasingly con-
troversial. As some of the early enthusiasm for the outsourcing "revolu-
tion ' 8 has worn off, critics argue that "the ostensible cost-savings
achieved by privatization turn out to be merely cost-shifting." 9 Better
results may come from enterprise, innovation, and introduction of tech-
nological advances within government rather than simply allowing pri-
vate contractors to juggle the books and reduce employee wages and
benefits. As this debate continues to influence the substantive rules re-
garding contracting-out, the point of particular legal interest is whether
procedural barriers will prevent, or allow, effective invocation of those
rules.
In the process of authoring the current casebook on government
contract law, I was initially surprised to find what seemed to be this
outdated standing barrier.10 However, beneath the abstract analysis, in
this as in other contexts of standing, the divisions among the judges re-
flect broad ideological visions - with some judges keen to bar the
Door to Federal Employee Challenges of Agency Determinations, 28 PUB. CONT. L.J. 203
(1999).
5 For background about federal employee labor unions, see Richard T. Dawson & W.
Kirk Underwood, Overview of Labor-Management Relations in the Air Force, 35 A.F. L. REV.
1 (1991); Michael R. McMillion, Collective Bargaining in the Federal Sector: Has the Con-
gressional Intent Been Fulfilled, 127 MIL. L. REV. 169 (1990).
6 American Federation of Government Employees v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 586
(May 10, 2000), affd, 2001 WL 826617 (Fed. Cir. July 23, 2001); Matter of American Feder-
ation of Government Employees, B-282904.2 (June 7, 2000).
7 Contracting Out: OMB Says Bush Budget Will Emphasize A-76, Improved Govern-
ment Performance, Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA), Feb. 27, 2001, at 228. For the author's treatment
of the range of new developments, see Charles Tiefer, Giving Away the Store: How Much
More Can the New Administration Surrender to Contractors?, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 5, 2001, at
36. See Newman, supra note 1 (both presidential campaigns in 2000 made promises about
future policies for holding down the size of the federal work force).
8 Mary E. Harney, The Quiet Revolution: Downsizing, Outsourcing, and Best Value,
158 MIL. L. REV. 48 (1998).
9 See, e.g., ROBERT KUTTNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS OF
MARKETS 358 (1999 ed.) (and sources cited). A series of GAO reports has cast doubt about
the savings from contracting-out. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OUTSOURCING
DOD LOGISTICS: SAVINGS ACHIEVABLE BY DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD'S PROJECTIONS ARE
OVERSTATED, REPORT No. GAO/NSIAD-98-48 (1997).
10 For a general treatment of the procedures for protesting decisions by the government
in the course of procurement, see CHARLES TIEFER & WILLIAM A. SHOOK, GOVERNMENT CON-
TRACT LAW 496-524 (1999), see also CHARLES TIEFER & WILLIAM A. SHOOK, GOVERNMENT
CONTRACT LAW 7-58 (Supp. 2000).
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courthouse doors to federal unions however meritorious their substantive
contentions, and others more willing to open those doors.II They recog-
nize a fundamental issue about the legal nature of government procure-
ment: whether the tribunals that are open to contractors' protests will
hear the other side, or whether this approach to marginalizing federal
unions will stand.' 2
This article summarizes the contracting-out laws and precedents, fo-
cusing on the recent 2000-2001 rulings. It then suggests approaches by
which each of the three branches - the Executive, Congress, or the
courts - could advance beyond outdated procedural barriers and allow
employee union protests.
I. THE BACKGROUND OF THE 2000-2001 RULINGS
Federal procuring agencies historically follow a number of system-
atic rules to decide whether and how to contract out for activities previ-
ously performed "in-house," i.e., by government employees. The Bureau
of the Budget published Circular A-76 in 1966 to distinguish which ac-
tivities might be contracted-out without violating the national interest,
and, as to those, to require cost comparisons for determining whether
contracting-out would generate savings.' 3 Since then, Congress has en-
acted various provisions, often as part of annual defense authorization
acts, regarding contracting-out, and the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) has extensively revised or supplemented A-76 in 1979,
1983, and 1996.14
Of particular interest to lawyers, both the courts and the GAO often
rule, in protests by disappointed bidders, about alleged violations of rules
during the contracting-out process.1 5 The statutory restrictions and the
cost comparisons for whether to contract out can be complex and contro-
l 1 See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics, 77 N.C. L. REv. 1741
(1999) (discussing political use of standing doctrine).
12 See generally Dep't of the Treasury v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 494 U.S. 922, 937
(1990)(Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting from majority decision that contracting out was
not a mandatory subject of bargaining) ("I take issue with the Court's expansive view of the
management rights provision as abrogating any union rights vis-A-vis decisions such as con-
tracting out.").
'3 The history of A-76 is discussed in Diebold v. United States, 947 F.2d 787, 798-99 n.8
(6th Cir. 1992).
14 See id. at 800-01; Gregory E. Lang, Best Value Source Selection in the A-76 Process,
43 A.F.L. REv. 239 (1997).
15 As to the General Accounting Office, see, e.g., Matter of BMAR & Assoc., B-
281,664, 1999 WL 170133 (Comp. Gen. 1999); Matter of DZS/Baker LLC, B-281,224 et al.,
1999 WL 46706 (Comp. Gen. 1999); Matter of Omni Corp., B-281,082, 1998 WL 911968
(Comp. Gen. 1998). As to courts, compare CC Distributors v. United States, 883 F.2d 146
(D.C. Cit. 1989) (standing) with Techniarts Engineering v. United States, 51 F.3d 301, 303 n. I
(D.C. Cit. 1995) (assuming that claims grounded in A-76 are subject to review while noting
doubts, and rejecting the protest on the merits).
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versial to apply, and alleged violations of them provide grist for protests.
Pursuant to the relevant statutes, Circular A-76 and its Supplemental
Handbook the government conducts a public-private competition, to see
whether the performance of the activity by public employees is more
cost-effective than performance by private contractors. Under current
procedure, the heart of the public-private competition consists of the pro-
curing agency estimating what a "Most Efficient Organization" would
cost to perform the activity in-house. 16
In other words, the public side of the competition consists not so
much of measuring just what the activity costs now, but rather what it
would cost with reforms.' 7 Many of these reforms may well involve a
proposal by a federal employee union for what its members could, and
would, do more efficiently or cheaply in order to preserve their in-house
jobs. The procuring agency then evaluates the union proposal in compar-
ison with contractor proposals. From this comparison the procuring
agency determines which proposal will provide the "best value" to the
government.18
Both sides - the contractors, and the federal employee union -
often complain of disputable points in that cost comparison. The con-
tractors often contend that the agency fails, in making that comparison,
properly to weigh how costly it is to continue the activity with federal
employees.' 9 By the same token, however, federal employee unions
demonstrating that the work can more efficiently continue being done in-
house often dispute the contractors' inflated claims of the potential sav-
ings from contracting-out. 20 This is particularly so in recent years, as the
Defense Department has contracted-out vigorously the activities of the
department's civilian employees, such as depot maintenance and equip-
ment repair. Employees and their unions contend that the upper-level
managers in the procuring agency have multiple reasons to accept con-
tractors' inflated over-estimates of the benefits of contracting-out the
lower-level jobs because (1) the upper-level managers themselves expect
after leaving the government to work for such contractors, (2) union-
economizing proposals can involve streamlining at the upper levels that
creates conflict within the procuring agency, and (3) they need to meet
16 See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, CIRCULAR No. A-76 REVISED SUPPLEMEN-
TAL HANDBOOK (March 1996).
17 "Agencies are encouraged to seek their Most Efficient Organization (MEO), without
penalty of historical inefficiencies." CIRCULAR No. A-76, supra note 16, chapter 2, section
A.4.
18 "Unions play a major role in the cost comparisons." Harney, supra note 8, at 91-92.
19 William A. Roberts III, Phillip H. Harrington, William S. Lieth, & Janet L. Eichers,
Unlevel Playing Field: Contracting Competition Against the Government Might Not Be Fully
Fair, LEGAL TIMES, March 5, 2001, at 32.
20 Federal Managers Urge Moratorium on Downsizing, Contracting Out, Fed Cont. Rep.
(BNA), Feb. 15, 2000.
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the Administration's ambitious goals for shrinking the federal govern-
ment's official in-house personnel numbers regardless of whether this
involves actual cost savings.2'
Procedurally, when it comes to presenting the legal contentions to a
neutral tribunal after the agency finishes its comparison, contractors have
had little difficulty in getting into protest tribunals such as the GAO. 22
Additionally, contractors have often successfully raised their contentions
in federal court. 23 By contrast, two major rulings in 2000 continue to
frustrate federal employee unions.
A. THE FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS
The federal courts split on whether federal employee unions have
standing to sue to protest contracting-out decisions. Opposing decisions
from the D.C. Circuit in 1989, and the Sixth Circuit in 1991, illustrate the
primary division as it persists into the new millennium, along with some
other notable decisions. 24 Under a divided panel ruling by the D.C. Cir-
cuit of National Federation of Federal Employees v. Cheney,25 a federal
employee union was kept from protesting an award to a private contrac-
tor.26 In deciding that the NFFE lacked standing, the majority stressed
the prudential "zone of interest" requirement. 27 The court noted that to
have standing under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 28 the inter-
ests of aggrieved parties must fall within the "zone of interest" of an
applicable statute.29 Since OMB Circular A-76 itself is not a statute, it
could not provide the relevant zone of interest. 30 Looking to the two
statutes that authorized A-76, the majority concluded that the federal em-
21 For an example of these charges in a particular context, see Render, supra note 3. For
a discussion of the contention that the Administration's thrust is to shrink the official personnel
size regardless of the ultimate lack of true savings from contracting-out, see Newman, supra
note 1.
22 See, e.g., Matter of Aberdeen Technical Serv., 2000 WL 239067 (Comp.Gen. Feb. 22,
2000), and GAO decisions cited therein.
23 See supra notes 8-14.
24 Nat'l Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Cheney, 883 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Diebold
v. United States, 947 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1991). Other notable examples of this split include:
Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 2017 v. Brown, 680 F.2d 722 (11 th Cir. 1982) (holding
a contracting-out not subject to judicial review); Int'l Ass'n. of Firefighters, Local 5-0100 v.
United States Dep't of Navy, 536 F.Supp. 1254 (D.R.I. 1982) (court had jurisdiction over
union challenge to contracting-out bid resolicitation).
25 Nat'l Fed. of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 883 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
26 See Cheney, 883 F.2d at 1039.
27 See id. at 1042.
28 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.
29 See id. (Congress gave only those within the "zone of interest," not to the public at
large, the right to invoke the statute for purposes of standing.)
30 See id. at 1043.
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ployee union did not have standing because its interest was adverse to the
purposes of the acts. 3'
This case had a strong dissenting opinion by Judge Mikva, however,
which pointed out that the section of the APA upon which the union
attempted to rely, section 702, was intended to broaden the field of plain-
tiffs who had standing to bring claims against administrative agencies. 32
Thus, this was the first instance in which the D. C. Circuit had denied
standing under that section, so that the majority was not so much pre-
serving old barriers to suit, as reviving them after their 1970s statutory
repeal. 33 Judge Mikva argued that the majority's opinion contradicts
Congress's intent by removing an entire class of important cases from
judicial review, even though the statutory violations inflict direct eco-
nomic injury on the would-be plaintiffs. 34
By contrast, the Sixth Circuit in the 1991 decision, Diebold v.
United States,35 held that the government decision to contract out the
operation of dining halls at Fort Knox was subject to review upon protest
by the federal employees who lost the work.36 The court held that there
is sufficient law in OMB Circular A-76 and its Supplement to justify
standing to sue.37 Further, the court found that the provisions of OMB
Circular A-76 are incorporated by reference into the Defense Depart-
ment's own regulations. 38 The court reasoned that the standards for de-
31 See id. The court considers the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 and finds that
nowhere in the statute or its legislative history did Congress contemplate federal employees or
their unions as parties that would challenge agencies that disregard the law. See id. at 1044.
The court concluded that, in fact, the Budget and Accounting Act assumed that some federal
employees would lose their government jobs in fulfillment of the Act's purpose. See id. at
1046. The court also looked at the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act Amendments of
1979 and found "nothing to suggest a Congressional purpose more than marginally related to
the interests of federal employees vis-d-vis procurement policy." Id. at 1049.
32 See id. at 1054 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting).
33 See id. at 1054-55. The Supreme Court, according to Judge Mikva, disapproved of a
stringent standing test in Clarke v. Securities Industry Association, 479 U.S. 388, 400 n. 15
(1987). See id. at 1054. Additionally, Judge Mikva finds that the Supreme Court has continu-
ally explained that "courts are to welcome those pursuing grievances under the APA." Id.
34 See id.
35 947 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1991).
36 See Diebold, 947 F.2d at 789.
37 See id. at 790. According to the Sixth Circuit, the General Accounting Office (GAO)
and Congress have both approved disappointed bidder cases founded on OMB Circular A-76.
See id. Additionally, since the promulgation of Circular A-76, supplements were added mak-
ing the cost comparison process in the Circular mandatory. See id.
38 See id. at 794.
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termining what constitutes a sufficient source of law to allow standing
have been broadening 39 over the last two decades. 40
In an unpublished 1996 decision, the Sixth Circuit reiterated this
view in National Air Traffic Controllers Association v. Pena.41 It main-
tained that employee unions could challenge contracting-out decisions,
provided the challenge was based on statutory grounds. 42 On remand the
employees argued that the loss of their government jobs was a sufficient
injury to establish standing, and the trial court agreed. 43 Since the indi-
vidual employees met the constitutional minimum of injury-in-fact, and
the prudential requirement of coming within the statutory "zone of inter-
ests," the trial court granted standing to the union. 44 The Seventh Circuit
decision in American Federation of Government Employees v. Cohen45
reflected some of the complexity of the division. The court held that a
federal employee union had standing to raise one procurement act but not
others in a protest as to contracting out of work at Air Force bases, split-
ting the difference between the Sixth and D.C. Circuit decisions.
B. THE GAO DECISIONS
Historically, the GAO has consistently heard cases by disappointed
bidders about contracting-out legal violations. An example was In re
RCA Service Company4 6, where a private contractor sued because the
Department of the Army canceled a request for proposals (RFP) and kept
RCA from seeking the contract.47 When the Competition in Contracting
39 The court noted that prior precedents reached the opposite conclusion, but explained
that they were decided under a previous version of A-76 with much narrower application. See
id. at 807-09.
40 See id. at 799-801. Like the D. C. Circuit panel, this panel also split, this time with the
dissenter echoing the majority in the D.C. Circuit, saying unions lack standing. See id. at 811
(Wellford, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting).
41 1996 WL 102421 (6th Cir. 1996).
42 See id. at *3. Although the court finds that "Circular A-76 is not a statute and cannot
form the basis for standing," other relevant statutes may be considered to determine overall
congressional intent. Id. Given that, the court considers the OFPPAA. See id.
43 See id. at 1342-43.
44 See id. at 1346. The three requirements for union standing are that the individual
members have standing, the interests at issue are germane to the organization's purpose, and
the participation of individual members is unnecessary. See id. The government argued un-
successfully that participation of individual members would also be required. See id.
45 171 F.3d 460 (7th Cir. 1999). See id. at 400.
46 B-208204.2, 83-1 CPD P 435 (1983), WL 26759. The challenged contract pertained to
certain custodial and security guard services at the United State Military Academy at West
Point. See id. RCA protested because the government did not re-solicit outside bids after a
change to the RFP. See id. Ordinarily, an agency decision to perform work in-house is not
subject to review. According to the GAO, however, because the agency decided to use the
procurement process, the decisions were subject to review. See id. at * 1-2. This is the general
view held by the GAO regarding review of A-76 actions. See id.
47 See RCA, 1983 WL 26759 at *1.
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Act (CICA) of 1984 was adopted, the GAO was statutorily granted juris-
diction over these types of cases. 48
The GAO has not, however, interpreted the CICA to allow protests
by employees or their unions. 49 Thus, while the GAO will address con-
tractor protests of A-76 decisions, it will not address those brought by
federal employees or their unions. Its denial of union protests lies in its
interpretation of "interested party."'50 According to the GAO definition
of interested parties, regardless of whether the employee union systemat-
ically submits proposals that should win the A-76 cost competition, what
it submits is not technically a "bid" and therefore the union is not an
interested party. 5' As a result, one of the most popular neutral forums
for protesting solicitations and contract awards is completely closed to
federal employees and their unions.
C. THE DECISIONS IN 2000-2001: AFGE v. U.S., AND MATTER
OF AFGE
The Federal Circuit decision, American Federation of Government
Employees v. United States,52 was a major showdown for federal em-
ployee unions. Congress had broadened the jurisdiction of the Court of
Federal Claims with a 1996 statute, providing the unions a solid basis for
requesting that the court look beyond the debatable precedents binding
courts in the past on this issue. Moreover, the political in-fighting of the
late 1990s over contracting-out had produced a significant substantive
Congressional enactment, the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of
1998 ("FAIR").53 Therefore, there was new substantive as well as proce-
dural statutory law for Judge Firestone of the Court of Federal Claims to
consider, and her opinion reflects alertness to the case's importance and
implications.
In this case, federal employees and their union claimed that there
were defects in the final cost comparison performed by the govern-
ment. 54 The government filed a motion to dismiss in response claiming
48 See 31 U.S.C. §3551(2) (2000).
49 See In re Panama DOD Employees Coalition, B-245,185, 91-2 CPD P 158 (1991),
WL 165244, *1 (noting the Competition in Contracting Act only allows protests by actual or
prospective bidders, which does not include the federal employees); In re Nat'l Fed'n of Fed.
Employees (NFFE) Local 2049, B-220,838, 85-2 CPD P 454 (1985), WL 53480, *1 (stating
that only actual or prospective bidders have the right to protest, and that the employees and
their union are not actual or prospective bidders).
50 See, e.g., In re Roach, B-227553.2, 87-2 CPD P 59 (1987) ("federal government em-
ployees simply are not actual or prospective offerors within the meaning of the statute and our
regulations").
51 See GAO opinions cited in the preceding two footnotes.
52 2001 WL 826617 (Fed. Cir. July 23, 2001).
53 Pub. L. No. 105-270, 112 Stat. 2382 (1998).
54 See AFGE, 46 Fed. Cl. at 588.
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the federal employees and their union lacked standing to sue.55 To deter-
mine if the federal employees and their union did in fact have standing,
the court conducted the classic three-pronged standing test.56
The first requirement is that the plaintiffs demonstrate they have
suffered an "injury in fact."'57 Interestingly, the court agreed 58 with the
union that the employees had suffered an "injury in fact" because, if the
work is contracted out, the government employees will lose their jobs. 59
After finding sufficient injury, the second requirement is that the plain-
tiffs show the injury is "fairly traceable" to the agency's action and that a
finding in the plaintiffs' favor will redress the injury.60 The union ar-
gued such traceability61 and redressability. 62 Citing Pena, Judge Fire-
stone again agreed with the plaintiffs regarding this prong of the test.63
The courts have largely gotten beyond the most extreme of the outdated
standing barriers and have recognized that whatever disputes exist over
employee union standing, they are not Article III constitutional disputes
over whether the employees can ever get into the courthouse for any
issue, i.e., disputes that they lack injury-in-fact, traceability, or redres-
sability. Rather, they are merely disputes over interpreting Congress'
intent in the statutes relating to contracting-out.64
The third, nonconstitutional or "prudential" prong requires the
plaintiffs to show that their interests are within the "zone of interests" of
the statute at issue. 65 While the plaintiffs argued they were within the
zone of interest of the relevant violated statutes, 66 Judge Firestone dis-
agreed with the union, and consequently denied standing. 67 Even here,
interestingly, the court recognized that in ADRA Congress intended a
broad jurisdiction for the Court of Federal Claims, and Judge Firestone
took a hard look at the new substantive law, the FAIR Act. She could
not have come closer to finding that the union had standing - without so
finding.
55 See id.
56 See id. at 595 (listing the three requirements for standing under the APA, which are
the same requirements as under ADRA).
57 See id.
58 See id. at 597 n.26 ("these plaintiffs satisfy the injury-in-fact test").
59 See id.
60 See id. at 595.
61 See id.
62 See id.
63 See id. at 597 n.26 ('Their job loss is reasonably traced to the alleged errors in the cost
comparison and would be redressed if they were to prevail.").
64 See id. at 595
65 See id. at 595.
66 See id. at 595 (alleging section 2(e) of FAIR and 10 U.S.C. § 2462(b) had been vio-
lated during the procurement).
67 See id. at 597.
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Judge Firestone looked at the 1990s Supreme Court Air Courier68
and NCUA69 rulings on the "zone of interest" test, and read them to re-
quire that Congress expressly grant federal employee standing. The
court reasoned that Congress specifically granted standing for federal
employees and their unions only as to certain aspects of the procurement
process, so the legislature must have intended to deny standing in all
other situations.70 Further, the court stated that the legislature is assumed
to have enacted the legislation with knowledge of the previous prece-
dents, such as the D.C. Circuit's position that unions cannot protest A-76
decisions. 71
On appeal, a Federal Circuit panel unanimously affirmed, with
Judge Schall writing a shorter, simpler opinion than Judge Firestone's.
Judge Schall found that the question of standing focused upon whether
the union and the federal employees met the definition of "interested
parties" in the 1996 ADRA, and that "the plain language of the statute
does not resolve this issue."'72 From the ADRA's legislative history, he
readily found that Congress intended to confer the full jurisdiction previ-
ously exercised by federal district courts pursuant to Scanwell Labs., Inc.
v. Shaffer,73 the only issue being whether federal employee unions could
bring protests pursuant to Scanwell. Judge Schall treated this as a ques-
tion that could go easily either way, evidently not seeing anything prob-
lematic in union standing to protest contracting-out.74
To resolve the question, he noted that the vast majority of cases
brought pursuant to Scanwell were brought by disappointed bidders, and
that the Scanwell opinions and the legislative history made references to
the standing of "disappointed bidders" or "contractors. ' 75 While Judge
Schall described ADRA's language as "not unambiguous," he observed
ADRA used the term "interested party," this being a formulation a little
68 Air Courier Conference of America v. American Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517
(1991).
69 Nat'l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479 (1998).
70 See AFGE, 46 Fed. Cl. at 598.
71 See id. at 600 (citing Cheney and noting that Congress is presumed to have had knowl-
edge of the interpretation given the provisions at issue in that case).
72 2001 WL 826617 at *4.
73 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
74 He noted that the breadth of the Administrative Procedure Act's wording, the fount of
Scanwell, suggests that "parties other than actual or prospective bidders might be able to bring
suit." 2001 WL 826617 at *6. On the other hand, the Court of Federal Claims' jurisdictional
statute, as a waiver of sovereign immunity, is to be construed narrowly. Id.
75 2001 WL 826617 at *6. That only means disappointed bidders were the most promi-
nent examples of parties with standing. It is interesting that Judge Schall did not present any
strong reason why the opinions or legislative history references to "disappointed bidders" or
"contractors" would have intended to rule out less prominent functional equivalents of disap-
pointed bidders, namely, in the A-76 process, employee unions presenting proposals for per-
forming the work in-house.
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narrower than the Administrative Procedure Act's "aggrieved" party, and
this also being a term used in CICA and defined there as limited to
bidders. 76 The opinion admitted it had to resolve an ambiguously
worded statute without strong indications, cited no policy arguments
against federal employee union standing, and seemed perfectly ready to
welcome union standing if only there were a little bit more of a green
light. Like Judge Firestone's, Judge Schall's opinion thus broke with the
somewhat anti-union door-closing tone of the divided D.C. Circuit panel
in National Federation of Federal Employees v. Cheney in 1989. Be-
cause Judge Firestone's opinion engaged more intensely with the issues,
it is more the subject of the analysis later in this article.
As for the other 2000 ruling, the GAO's June 2000 ruling in Matter
of American Federation of Government Employees,77 federal employees
and their union protested the award of a contract to a private company. 78
The GAO held that the employees and their union could not protest the
award because they had not submitted a "bid" as a contractor for the
work and so were not "interested parties" as defined by the CICA.79 One
or more contractors might submit their offer, or "bid," for the contract
they would make with the federal government to do the work, but the
GAO would not consider the federal union's counter-proposal a "bid"
because, even if it led the government to continue to perform the work
in-house in a different way, such a proposal becomes a guide internal to
the government, not an external contract between the government and a
private entity. It cited Judge Firestone's ruling in May, the month
before, in holding that federal employees and their unions have no stand-
ing to protest under the FAIR Act. Consequently, the GAO dismissed the
protest for lack of standing.80
II. AVENUES FOR REFORM
The 2000-2001 rulings have not opened the tribunal doors to federal
employee unions protesting violations of the contracting-out rules, but
neither have those rulings welded the doors shut. As for the federal
courts, the question should remain subject to future reconsideration, if an
opportunity arises, considering the reaffirmed favorable stance of the
Sixth Circuit in NATCA v. Pena, the many elements recognized as im-
portant and favorable (although not ultimately decisive) by Judge Fire-
stone, and the absence of strongly antagonistic statements in Judge
76 Id. at *7.
77 2000 WL 732884, B-282904.2 (2000).
78 See id. at *1.
79 See id. at *3 (stating "interested parties" are "actual or prospective bidders" under the
CICA).
80 See id. at *4-6.
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Schall's Federal Circuit decision. There is now a problem in getting an
opportunity for a fresh judicial look at the matter,81 such as either the
Supreme Court taking a case or some fresh development presenting the
matter to the courts anew. With the GAO, by contrast, since its rulings
are not subject to judicial review, there is no likelihood of change if the
same basic question is presented again.
For both judicial and GAO tribunals, opening the doors is possible
two other ways. The Executive Branch could reconsider its resistance to
employee union protests, particularly as part of some broader reconsider-
ation by Executive Order of relations with employee unions; this would
immediately allow GAO rulings on these protests by the little-known
"nonstatutory" method. Alternatively, Congress could help open the
doors either by new enactment supporting union protest suits, or by cer-
tain kinds of nonstatutory signals. In other words, contracting-out
presents the unusual situation in which any one of the three branches of
government can overthrow an outdated procedural barrier, and the nu-
ances of the mechanisms for doing so warrant attention.
A. COURTS SHOULD VIEW UNIONS AS WITHIN THE ACTUAL "ZONE
OF INTERESTS"
The opinion for the Federal Circuit by Judge Schall affirming the
fuller opinion below of Judge Firestone should actually enable any courts
freshly considering the matter to view federal employee unions which
protest contracting-out as within the "zone of interest" for, and within the
meaning of "interested parties" in, the relevant statutes. With that focus,
several lines of reasoning show why the courts should rule, if they have
an opportunity82 for further judicial consideration, to allow union
protests.
First, Congress' intent continues even more clearly after the enact-
ment of the FAIR Act that the administrative and judicial system should
accord standing on a "provider-neutral" basis to ensure the most cost-
effective method (contracting-out or in-house) for performance of activi-
ties. Without going through all the enactments from the 1921 Budget Act
81 For protests brought only in the Court of Federal Claims, the AFGE decision is stare
decisis until there is a new development. The problem is that Congress did not act to postpone
the ADRA provision that sunsetted concurrent federal district court bid protest jurisdiction as
of January 1, 2001. Scanwell bid protests do not seem to be brought in the district courts now,
notwithstanding the theoretical argument that they can still be brought there. See Christopher
M. Chaisson, Michael Heyman, Alexandra Hill & Jonathan Neerman, The Sunset of Scanwell
Jurisdiction, 30 PuB. CONT. L.J. 65 (2000)(briefs on this issue published after a moot court
competition).
82 Examples of fresh opportunities would be if new federal legislation either revived the
sunsetted district court jurisdiction or made some generic change in the jurisdiction of the
Court of Federal Claims. Admittedly, neither of these is in immediate prospect.
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and the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act Amendments of 1979,
to the annual DOD authorization provisions of recent years, Congress
maintained one consistent intent: that the government should contract out
when, but only when, it is most cost-effective. 83 The FAIR Act of 1998
renewed this consistent intent.84 There is no Congressional decision to
contract-out either to shrink the federal government's size arbitrarily or
to accomplish any other goals, when doing so by contracting-out would
be more expensive than by in-house performance. For every pro-con-
tractor Senator or Congressman from 1921 to the present who extolled
the virtues of contracting-out during the debates on these statutes, there
has been another Senator or Congressman reminding that Congress' in-
terest is the most economical result for the taxpayers, and that lining the
pockets of contractors by mistaken money-losing decisions to contract
out does not follow Congress' intent.
FAIR itself reflects how this Congressional intent persisted even
during the ascension of the pro-contractor Republican majority in Con-
gress in the 1994 election. As originally proposed by pro-contractor
Members, the "Freedom from Government Competition Act" would in-
deed have tilted toward the contracting-out of procurement. 85 However,
as Judge Firestone soundly traced, the final FAIR "contained very differ-
ent language" 86 from the original bills, dropping the mandate of a pro-
contracting-out stance which disregarded the cost-effectiveness of in-
house work. The original version faced not only intense union opposi-
tion but a probable Presidential veto; the compromise version went to the
safer, less controversial, and stronger ground of continuing the traditional
intent to find the most cost-efficient method of obtaining performance
without tilting either way.
With that statutory intent of finding the provider-neutral cost-effec-
tive method, it is senseless to structure the procedures for protests as
though the contractors fall within the "zone of interest" of these statutes,
but the unions do not. Both contractors and employee unions want the
work. Contractors fall within the "zone of interest" of these statutes, not
necessarily because Congress has affirmatively intended to give them the
work, but because Congress wants a fair and accurate public-private cost
competition to determine whether contracting-out will bring savings.
Contractors come within the "zone of interest" to protest failure to pro-
vide that fair competition. Employee unions are in exactly the same po-
sition: they fall within the "zone of interest" of these statutes, not
83 Lang, supra note 14, at 240 (A-76 decision is to be made on the basis of "best value"
to the government).
84 Section 2(e) of the FAIR, 112 Stat. 2382, requires the cost comparison between public
and private performance to be "realistic and fair."
85 See id. at 597.
86 See id. at 597.
2001]
594 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 10:581
necessarily because Congress has affirmatively intended for them to keep
the work, but because they have a symmetric interest to that of the con-
tractors in protesting whenever the procuring agency fails to conduct a
legally sustainable public-private cost competition to determine whether
contracting-out will bring savings - as unions have argued in AFGE,87
Cheney,88 and (successfully) in Diebold.8 9
Typically, in a contracting-out decision, the agency evaluates a
union proposal for keeping the work in-house, and a private contractor
proposal to perform the work. If the agency commits violations of law in
misevaluating the former as better, the contractor's protest vindicates
Congressional intent. But, if it commits such violations of law in mis-
evaluating the latter as better, the union's protest symmetrically vindi-
cates Congressional intent. In fact, the A-76 Administrative Appeals
process renders contractors and employees equally eligible to appeal ad-
ministratively.90 As Judge Mikva said in 1989: "an action brought by
[the federal employee union] to assure that the Army chooses to obtain
needed services by the least expensive means is wholly consistent with
Congress' purposes." 91
A different line of reasoning looks at the process of enacting the
statutes relating to contracting-out. Judge Firestone cited the two main
Supreme Court cases of the 1990s regarding the "zone of interests"
test-Air Courier Conference of America v. American Postal Workers
Union92 and National Credit Union Administration v. First National
Bank and Trust Co.93 But, Judge Firestone did not explore these cases
much or apply them with care to the contracting-out statutes.94 The first
case, Air Courier, held that with respect to the provision that historically
had given the Postal Service a monopoly over private express courier
services, nothing involving postal jobs was within the "zone of interest"
of the statute.95 According to Justice Rehnquist's opinion, the purpose of
the postal monopoly statute was to ensure that the appropriate postal
charges were collected to support the federal government postal effort; in
effect, the statute served as revenue-protection for the government mo-
87 See id. at 599 (stating the federal employees claim they are within the zone of interests
of the statutes at issue because they are ensuring the most economical organization is found,
which comports with Congress' intent).
88 See Cheney, 883 F.2d at 1044-52 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (discussing Congress' intent to find
the most economical organization when enacting the relevant statutes).
89 See Diebold, 947 F.2d 787, 810 (stating the purposes of the statute were best served by
allowing protests by federal employees).
90 CIRCULAR No. A-76, supra note 16, at 7(c)(8).
91 883 F.2d at 1059.
92 498 U.S. 517 (1991).
93 522 U.S. 479 (1998).
94 See AFGE, 46 Fed. Cl. at 600 n.27.
95 See Air Courier, 498 U.S. at 525-26.
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nopoly.96 Since Justice Rehnquist showed that the postal monopoly stat-
ute was enacted prior to employing the postal workers at a time when
postal service really was contracted-out in an old-fashioned sense, Con-
gress could not possibly have been considering any interests of the not-
yet-in-existence postal workers in enacting the statute.
National Credit Union, the more recent decision, moderated the in-
tensity of Air Courier, for the Court found that banks came within the
"zone of interests" of the credit union statute's limitation provisions. 97
The Court's majority did so despite strong evidence Congress had no
concern whatsoever for the bank's competitive interests vis-A-vis credit
unions.98 The Air Courier decision did distinguish federal union suits (in
that case, the postal unions) from business competitor suits, but it hardly
amounted to a general prohibition of federal union standing - for the
Court has entertained many a case by federal employee unions. Rather,
Justice Rehnquist's careful opinion traced the entire history of the postal
monopoly statute in the 1800s to show Congress had not thought of em-
ployees in enacting the statute. As Justice Rehnquist showed, Congress
quite clearly did not intend any comparison rule or process by which
relaxation of the postal monopoly would be weighed by comparing in-
house services with those of private contractors. In contrast with the
postal monopoly statutes in Air Courier, Congress has thought about sav-
ings-comparisons of federal employee performance versus contracted-out
performance every step of the way in constructing and overseeing the
modern system known as A-76. This is seen most recently in the FAIR
Act, but is similarly seen in the other statutes. The legislative record
overwhelming shows that the federal unions actively participated in the
drafting of the statutes, raising these comparisons high in Congress'
awareness. 99
To understand that federal employee unions today, in contrast to the
non-existent postal employees at the start of the postal service, play an
active part in the Congress' consideration of contracting-out, let us focus
our review on just a sampling from the past couple of years. We will
find federal employee unions testifying about contracting-out before the
following: in 1997, the House Committee on Government Reform and
96 See id. at 525.
97 522 U.S. at 498-99.
98 In National Credit Union the Court noted again that the statute in the previous deci-
sion was enacted solely for the purpose of protecting the revenues of the post office, and thus
was not at all concerned with the postal employees. See Nat'l Credit Union, 522 U.S. at 498-
99.
99 See AFGE, 46 Fed. Cl. at 600 (citing 144 Cong. Rec. S9104 as evidence that the
unions participated in the drafting of the relevant legislation).
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Oversight, 100 and the House Committee on National Security;' 0 ' in 1998,
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, and the Senate Appro-
priations Committee;10 2 and in 1999, the House Appropriations Commit-
tee, 10 3 and the Senate Appropriations Committee. 10 4 In other words, the
statutory provisions regarding contracting-out, such as the annual DOD
authorization act provisions, are not statutes written, like the postal mo-
nopoly statute, without unions in mind. Instead, their subtle balance
matches Congressional attention to the competing messages of contrac-
tors and unions.
Accordingly, Congress' awareness of the unions' important role in
contracting-out cost-comparisons not only far exceeds the blank opposite
record in Air Courier, it considerably exceeds the record that supported a
zone-of-interest determination in the National Credit Union Association
case. We do not have a Supreme Court that has created some super-
restrictive zone-of-interest standard. NCUA, like other late 1990s cases,
shows that the Court has no fears (and appropriately so) of any flood of
administrative appeals or other misuse of the judiciary from a reasonable
view of Congress' intent in this regard. NCUA supports allowing union
protests of violations of law in contracting-out. Based on it, the courts
should entertain such protests.
B. EXECUTIVE ACTIONS
Another approach would be for an executive order to be issued al-
lowing "non-statutory" protests by federal employees in the GAO. "Stat-
utory" protests occur under the terms of the Competition in Contracting
Act (CICA); a non-statutory protest is a GAO protest not under the terms
of CICA, such as all protests were before CICA, 10 5 as long as the agency
involved has agreed to have protests decided in that forum. Section
21.13 of the GAO Bid Protest Regulations authorizes protests in an array
of situations that are ruled out by the GAO as CICA-based statutory pro-
tests. It provides that the "GAO will consider protests concerning
awards of subcontracts by or for a Federal agency, sales by a Federal
agency, or procurements by agencies of the government other than Fed-
100 1997 WL 606280 (F.D.C.H.) (testimony of NFFE president) (Oct. 1, 1997); 1997 WL
606281 (F.D.C.H.) (testimony of NTEU president) (Oct. 1, 1997).
10 1997 WL 331912, at 142 (F.D.C.H.) (hearing transcript of testimony by AFGE presi-
dent) (June 17, 1997).
102 1998 WL 17545 (F.D.C.H.) (testimony of AFGE president) (March 24, 1998); 1998
WL 156271 (F.D.C.H.) (testimony of NTEU president) (March 24, 1998).
103 1999 WL 166694 (F.D.C.H.) (testimony of former AFGE president) (March 25,
1999).
104 1999 WL 307409 (F.D.C.H.) (testimony of AFGE national vice president) (May 14,
1999).
105 See, e.g., In re RCA Service Company, 1983 WL 26759, B-208204.2, 83-1 CPD P
435 (1983).
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eral agencies" - in other words, an array of categories of protests not
under CICA - "if the agency involved has agreed in writing to have
protests decided by GAO."'10 6 GAO itself invited, in its June 2000 deci-
sion, a resort by unions to non-statutory protests, as long as the procuring
agencies agree. 10 7
Taking up this GAO invitation, an Executive Order could be issued
which allows the GAO to hear protests, thus giving the federal employ-
ees a place to bring their symmetric counter-arguments to those the GAO
entertains from contractors in the contracting-out process. This would
result in a logical step forward in the partnership process of the govern-
ment and the federal employee unions.
Another possible solution is to supplement Circular A-76 and allow
a selective litigation policy. The Administration as a whole, or particular
agencies, could establish a policy where agencies selectively allowed the
GAO to hear union protests to contracting out - for example, whenever
the contracting out was not pursuant to an affirmative command from the
departmental head, but involved genuine higher-level openness of mind
and a genuine willingness to have a legally valid cost-comparison pro-
cess between the proposals of unions and contractors. It would be ironic
indeed, for example, if a supposed sympathizer for labor rights such as
the Labor Department refused permission for union contentions to be
heard, if, say, the Department proposed that some of its work be con-
tracted out. 108 More speculatively, a selective litigation policy could
come from the Department of Justice, which does reconsider from time
to time how "hard" a line to take in court against litigants with standing
issues. 10 9 Particularly when new statutory provisions and new regula-
tions are adopted, if the Department of Justice does not reflexively deny
union standing every time a contracting-out rule is the basis of a protest,
then courts would have an opportunity to better recognize the arguments
on the unions' side. In doing so, the courts would likely discover that the
106 4 C.F.R. § 21.13(a).
107 See Matter of AFGE, 2000 WL 732884, at *6 n.2 ("we consider non-statutory protests
if the agency involved has agreed in writing to have the protests decided by the GAO...").
108 For the Labor Department to deny the right of unions and contractors to have a legal
contest recalls the comment in the movie DR. STRANGELOVE (Columbia Tri-Star 1964) about a
brawl in the Pentagon, "Gentlemen, you can't fight in here - this is the War Room."
109 For example, the Bush Administration took a hard line against standing in some con-
texts, see CHARLES TIEFER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PRESIDENT 52-53 (1994); while it did not
defend the constitutionality of standing pursuant to the 1986 statutory amendments for the qui
tam statute, the Clinton Administration did defend the constitutionality of such standing, and
was ultimately vindicated by the Supreme Court in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v.
United States ex rel. Stevens, 120 S. Ct. 1858 (2000).
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federal employees do fall within the zone of interest of the evolving stat-
utes and rules.110
C. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION OR SIGNALING
A final possibility, if necessary, is Congressional action. In theory,
this could take the form of legislation. Federal employees were granted
the right through legislation to administratively protest the list of "inher-
ent governmental functions.""' So, similarly, in theory, the other
branches could await Congress doing the same for union protesting in
GAO or court; but in practice, this may be unrealistic. The history of
standing doctrine has been that with rare exceptions, Congress keeps its
attention focused on the substantive issues, and leaves it to the tribunals
to develop the standing rules. Neither of the Supreme Court opinions
discussed before, the Air Courier or NCUA opinion, involved an express
Congressional decision about "zone of interests" in standing. It is asking
a great deal to expect the employee unions to accomplish the heavy lift-
ing involved in moving through Congress a special express provision for
their standing, when the contractors bidding for contracting-out, to take
the symmetric example, never have to move any such express provision
for their right to file protests. The courts inferred contractor standing;
they should infer union standing.
What legislators in Congress might do, rather than move an express
statutory provision all the way through Congress, would be to signal their
support, either as individuals or as committees, for the entertaining of
employee union protests. It is well established in Congress that an indi-
vidual chair or ranking minority member can task GAO to conduct a
GAO inquiry into waste or abuse. It might be that similar tasking or
encouragement could occur for something quite similar to a GAO inquiry
into waste, namely, a GAO legal inquiry into union allegations that con-
tracting-out was occurring in a situation of legally invalid cost-compari-
sons and legally challengeable inflation of alleged cost-savings. In other
words, a senior Member or a committee could ask the GAO for some-
thing similar to a non-statutory protest decision. This would be particu-
larly appropriate considering that the GAO already, on its own, has
conducted a series of inquiries and produced reports regarding the in-
flated estimates by contractors of the savings from contracting-out. 12
110 See, e.g., Diebold, 947 F.2d at 801-10 (discussing the recent developments in the law
and finding that under these developments the employees do fall under the zone of interest).
I 11 See Section 3(b) of FAIR, supra note 53 (giving federal employees and their unions
the right to protest the inclusion or exclusion of a certain activity from the list of inherent
governmental functions).
1 12 See supra.
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III. CONCLUSION
The 2000-2001 decisions have denied federal employee unions a
forum to protest when the work of their members is contracted-out in
violation of laws and regulations. This disserves the public interest, the
intent behind those laws and regulations, and the sense of fair play be-
tween the contractors and the federal unions that compete for that work.
It is unsound as a matter of law. One way or another, the courts, the
Executive, or the Members of Congress can and should let union protests
of improper contracting-out be heard.

